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Mysteries, Markets, and Myths: Publishing
Relevant Policy Research
David W. Stewart
This issue of the Journal of Public Policy & Marketing (JPPM) is the last to be published during my tenure
as editor. The five years I have served as editor have been a time of growth for the journal: growth in
submissions, growth in the number of papers published, and growth in the influence of JPPM. Serving as the
editor of a major journal such as JPPM is a learning experience. My service as editor of JPPM, combined with
my prior terms as editor of Journal of Marketing and Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,
has taught me a great deal about the marketing discipline, the enterprise of scholarly research, and the
role of marketing in a broader societal context. I use this final editorial to share some of what I have learned
and to offer advice to scholars who wish to contribute to scholarship in marketing and public policy.

decisions, or even general management and financial performance decisions, remain to be well articulated.
Similarly, there is much mystery about policy. Among
marketing scholars this mystery arises, in part, because few
of them have been systematically exposed to the mechanisms
of policy analysis, formulation and implementation. But, like
the concept of a market, “policy” is also an abstraction that,
like markets, is often studied by example. Policy exists at
many levels, and many policy debates are not so much about
“problems”—though there is ample room for debate about
problems—as it is about how these problems might be
addressed. Policies can exist at the local level, the state level,
the national level, the international level, and all manner of
other levels (e.g., government, corporate, industry, not-forprofit organizations, various other governing and standardsetting bodies). A naive perspective, often included in the
implications section in otherwise good submissions to JPPM,
is that policy makers will find the reported results useful or that
policy makers should “do something.” Such recommendations
are not helpful because they do not identify which policy
makers, at what level, and for what purpose.
Indeed, marketing, a discipline with unique expertise in the
design of value delivery systems, should have much to contribute to the discussion of policy formulation—the design of
efficient and effective systems and institutions for producing
specific outcomes that serve the general welfare of a society.
Such contributions require a far deeper understanding of both
markets and policy making than is evident in much of marketing scholarship, including that published in JPPM. It requires
careful analysis of problems and opportunities and careful
analysis of alternatives for addressing problems and realizing
opportunities. Marketers have a long history of identifying
market opportunities and of assessing both the relative merits
of different opportunities and different approaches to realizing these opportunities. There is a need to apply this same
discipline to the examination of policy alternatives. This also
means separating the evaluation of “problems” and “opportunities” from specific policy decisions designed to address these
problems and opportunities. This separation will create a richer

The Mysterious Character of Scholarship
on Marketing and Public Policy
mong doctoral students, new scholars, and much of
the public at large, publishing in academic journals is a
mystery. What is selected for publication and why; the
process of peer review; the roles of theory and prior empirical
work; and the factors that contribute to the impact, or influence,
of published scholarship are difficult to reduce to a simple
formula. Scholars can become more successful with practice over
time, learning by doing, but part of the mystery still remains.
The reason for this continuing mystery is that scholarship is
inherently a creative activity, and therefore, it is best evaluated
upon completion rather than in advance. The mystery of successful scholarship exists for all journals, but scholarship related to
marketing and public policy appears to be especially mysterious.
The reasons for the mysterious nature of scholarship related
to marketing and public policy are related to the abstract nature
of markets and policy. Whereas one can observe and talk to
an individual consumer or a collection of consumers, markets
are defined by complex interactions among buyers, sellers,
suppliers, intermediaries, influencers, facilitators, institutional
infrastructures, and a host of other dimensions. Perhaps this is
why so much “marketing research” focuses on groups of identifiable consumers or the outcomes associated with identifiable
consumers’ behaviors in specific markets. Such research involves
studying the larger phenomenon, a market, by example and necessitates the integration of research across numerous examples to
arrive at general principles. The good news for marketing is
that there have been some successful efforts at such integration (Hanssens 2015; Leone and Schultz 1980; Marketing Accountability Standards Board 2017). The bad news
is that there are too few such efforts, and the linkages to policy
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and more useful dialogue for scholars and policy makers. Too
much policy debate today conflates problems with solutions.
For example, one can agree that there is serious cause for
concern about the environment but reject specific policies
as ineffective, inefficient from a cost–benefit perspective, or
likely to produce consequences that are undesirable on other
dimensions, even if the policy successfully addresses the focal
problem (e.g., prohibition).
There are also a variety of assumptions—myths, actually—
that often reside in policy-related scholarship and in policy
making. Marketers could add significant gravitas to their contributions by identifying these myths, making them explicit, and
elucidating the reality in contrast to the myth.

Myths
There is no doubt that competition among suppliers is an
important form of competition with the potential to benefit
consumers. Economists, who have dominated much of the
policy debate regarding competition, have tended to focus
on supply-side competition. It is clearly important that such
competition be “fair” and provide a means for innovation and
creative destruction that produces new, better, and less expensive alternatives for consumers (Schumpeter 1942). Competition
among suppliers is not the same as competition between buyers
and sellers. Much of what has been written about markets in a
policy context begins with the premise that markets are a
competition between buyers and sellers. A corollary of this view
is that markets represent a zero-sum game in which there are
always winners and losers. The role of government (policy) in
such markets is to establish the rules of the game and insure that
the competition is “fair.”
There is no need for markets to be characterized as composed
of winners and losers, at least when analyzing relationships
among buyers and sellers. It is certainly the case that some
markets have a structure that creates winners and losers, but
this is not an inherent characteristic of buyer–seller markets.
The marketing literature is filled with discussions of long-term
relationships between buyers and sellers, market orientation,
and cocreation, among other concepts, that suggest more cooperative and collaborative relationships between sellers and
buyers. The role of “policy” with respect to such collaborative
relationships is (or should be) different from its role in markets
characterized by more competition between buyers and sellers.
Furthermore, the relative market power of buyers is quite
strong compared with that of sellers, at least in many markets.
The consumer who shops by comparing prices and product
descriptions online with the aid of consumer reviews possesses a
great deal of knowledge and power. Similarly, the retail shopper
who uses a mobile telephone to compare prices and products
within a store possesses enormous leverage, much to the chagrin
of many retailers. There are, of course, still vulnerable consumers
who require protection, but policy with respect to the markets
and competition must recognize the power of the consumer in a
connected, digital era.
Any policy analysis related to markets must also recognize
that markets tend to work very well. Markets are so successful
that the only time they really receive attention, except from the
scholarly class, is when they appear to fail. A common myth,
especially among policy makers, but also among some contributors to JPPM, is that market failure is common. There is no

evidence that market failure is common, especially when markets
are genuinely free.
In some policy work related to markets, there is often an
implicit (if not explicit) assumption that any problem—whether
it be obesity, smoking, lack of financial literacy, environmental
destruction, or just general dissatisfaction—is driven by market
failure. Such assumptions deserve to be tested. At minimum,
there is a need to identify whether there is a “market” issue
rather than, say, an educational problem, a personal preference
for a lifestyle some find undesirable, or a mood disorder. If there
is a market issue, the next question is whether it is the case that
the market has failed, and if so, why? If there is a market failure,
is the failure really attributable to the way the market mechanism works or does not work, or has the market mechanism
been distorted by government actions or other externalities?
Marketers, with their distinctive expertise related to the design
of value delivery systems, are uniquely qualified to contribute to
such analyses.
An additional common myth is that “policy” is carried out by
decision makers in some monolithic institution. Yet, as noted
previously, policy exists in many forms and at many different
levels. The reporting of a finding that may or may not result
from some market failure with the implication that “policy
makers” should pay attention to the finding and/or do something
about it is, at best, intellectually lazy. Indeed, some apparent
market failures arise from the existence of competing and
contradictory policies at different levels of government, a
topic that should receive more attention from marketing
scholars interested in policy issues.
Another set of myths when addressing policy issues, whether
related to markets and marketing or other areas, revolves around
attributions regarding the motives of business and government.
Business is often viewed as self-serving and lacking the motivation to serve the larger society. There is no doubt that this is
the case for some business managers and some businesses.
There are also bad actors in business. However, government, at
whatever level, has its own share of bad actors, and many policy
actions are driven by motives that are often inconsistent with
general social welfare. Government is not a neutral arbiter; nor
is it benign or benevolent. The entire discipline of public choice
focuses on the role of economic and other motives that drive
political and policy-making behavior (Buchanan and Turlock
1962). It is not difficult to find examples of policy that does not
serve general consumer welfare but, rather, exists to serve the
needs of special interest groups. One of those special interest
groups includes policy makers, government employees, and
others who often have strong economic interests in defining
problems in a particular way and in support of particular selfserving policies. The self-interest of government is problematic
for at least three reasons: (1) the process of creative destruction
that characterizes most markets is largely absent in government
organizations owing to a lack of competition; (2) policy makers
often exhibit the Kruger–Dunning syndrome (Kruger and
Dunning 1999), in which people fail to recognize their own
limitations and attribute to themselves superior insight and skill
relative to the general population; and (3) the concentration of
power and resources in government provides the means for
especially destructive, large-scale actions.
Scholars who aim to understand markets and public policy
need a healthy skepticism of both markets and government.
Both institutions are necessary for a society to provide for its
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needs, but both are subject to failure. The myths of corporate
profit seeking to the exclusion of other objectives and of a
benevolent government altruistically providing for social welfare
not only are unhelpful, they blind research to true and creative
insights about how a society might best provide for its needs.
Finally, there is a myth that it is possible to study markets and
public policy in a value-free context. Value judgments permeate
consumers’ choices about what they buy and chose to consume.
The consumption of a product by one consumer who enjoys the
pleasure it provides is an expression of values, just as another
consumer’s objection to the use of the same product is a value
judgment. Markets can and often do operate to serve different
tastes, preferences, and values within a society; thus, markets
are often segmented and products differentiated. Policy, in
contrast, generally involves an effort to impose uniformity,
including a uniformity of values. Thus, there will always be a
tension between market and government. It is important that
scholars working at the intersection of marketing and policy
acknowledge and explicitly articulate the role of values in the
operations of markets and the design of policies. This does
not mean abandoning personal values; rather, it means being explicit about these values and making them a part of a
constructive dialogue.

unique contribution to understanding and improving the performance of markets and social welfare receives too little attention, even in the pages of a journal like JPPM. Marketing’s
status as a research enterprise, as a contributor to the performance of organizations, and as a means to improve quality of
life and social welfare will grow as it more directly and positively addresses the implications of its scholarship for achieving
these objectives. Doing so will also increase the probability of
publishing in JPPM and remove a bit of the mystery.

Some Concluding Comments

Leone, Robert P., and Randall L. Schultz (1980), “A Study of
Marketing Generalizations,” Journal of Marketing, 44 (1), 10–18.

Marketing is an extraordinary discipline with a unique perspective about how a society can and should provide for its
needs and wants. No discipline has greater expertise regarding
consumer behavior and the design of value delivery systems.
The social science that marketers conduct is as good as any in
any other discipline, but too often marketing’s important and

References
Buchanan, James, and Gordon Turlock (1962), The Calculus of
Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Hanssens, Dominique (2015), Empirical Generalizations About
Marketing Impact, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science
Institute.
Kruger, Justin, and David Dunning (1999), “Unskilled and Unaware
of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence
Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments,” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 77 (6), 1121–34.

Marketing Accountability Standards Board (2017), Brand Investment
and Valuation Project. Islamorada, FL: Marketing Accountability
Standards Board.
Schumpeter, Joseph (1942), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.
New York: Harper & Bros.

